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Beyond Cut Flowers: Developing a
Clinical Perspective on Critical Legal
Theory
by
PHYLLIS GOLDFARB*
The critical theory project, as propounded by the critical legal stud-
ies (cls) movement,' resembles in certain respects the clinical education
project as some clinical educators describe and practice it. Although
proponents of other alternative legal theories, most notably critical race
theorists2 and feminist legal theorists, 3 have engaged the critical legal
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. B.A. 1978, Brandeis Univer-
sity; Ed.M. 1979, Harvard University; J.D. 1982, Yale University; L.L.M. 1985, Georgetown
University Law Center. Thanks to Tony Alfieri, Barbara Bezdek, Richard Boldt, Jim Doyle,
Chris Gilkerson, and Theresa Glennon for comments on earlier drafts, to Dean Daniel Coquil-
lette for continuing research support, to Monica Brettler and Richard Lara for research assist-
ance, and to Barbara Koocher for word processing support. I am especially grateful to the
Hastings Law Journal and Hastings Women's Law Journal, spurred by Tony Alfieri's vision,
for organizing an engaging conference that provided an opportunity to present drafts of papers
for this symposium and receive useful feedback. I must express special gratitude to Paul Kelly
as well, who was a student in the Boston College Criminal Process clinic in the fall of 1991.
Armed with excerpts from Jerome Frank, Paul initiated conversations with me on the relation-
ship of legal realism and poststructuralism to his clinical casework. The intellectual connec-
tions made by students like Paul are part of what makes clinical teaching so gratifying.
1. I use "cls" in this Essay rather than the more common typography "CLS" because I
have been persuaded by Mark Tushnet's assertions about the politics of capitalization. Capi-
talization indicates something beyond the ordinary, whereas lower-case letters indicate that
"critical" and "legal" are ordinary adjectives preceding the word "studies." See Mark
Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1514, 1516 n.4 (1991).
2. See, e.g., Jose A. Bracamonte, Minority Critiques of the Critical Legal Studies Move-
ment, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. RnV. 297 (1987); Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Stud-
ies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985
(1990); Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331 (1988); Patricia Williams,
Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils and Promise of Critical Legal Theory for Peoples of
Color, 5 LAW & INEQ. 103 (1987) [hereinafter Williams, Taking Rights Aggressively]; see also
Phyllis Goldfarb, From the Worlds of "Others': Minority and Feminist Responses to Critical
Legal Studies, 26 NEw ENG. L. REv. (forthcoming 1992) [hereinafter Goldfarb, From the
Worlds of "Others'1 (describing the minority and feminist critiques of critical legal theories).
3. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives
from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 589 (1986); Robin West, Jurisprudence and
Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 1 (1988) [hereinafter West, Jurisprudence]; Robin West, Femi-
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studies movement in a discussion of its ideas, clinical educators have yet
to do so. This Essay represents a preliminary attempt to fill that void,
highlighting the resemblances between the two movements, and elaborat-
ing a clinical educator's perspective on some of the ideas associated with
critical legal studies.
An examination of the relationship between clinical legal education
and critical legal studies promises to be a profitable one, since each can
trace its philosophical roots to the school of legal realism. Critical legal
studies' proponents, particularly those who have espoused and elabo-
rated the indeterminacy critique, are the heirs to the version of legal real-
ism generally known as "rule skepticism."' 4 Rule skepticism refers to the
idea that our legal system, following its own rules, can produce diametri-
cally opposed conclusions on most legal questions, revealing that doctri-
nal logic rarely compels a particular result.5
Clinical legal education is rarely invoked when scholars describe the
modem day offspring of legal realism. This is an oversight, as clinical
legal education is the heir apparent to the version of legal realism known
as "fact skepticism."' 6 Fact skepticism refers to the idea that the legal
system is incapable of reconstructing the complexity of past events with
enough accuracy to afford certainty to decisionmakers or observers about
what has occurred and what should occur.7 The respective historical
nism, Critical Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59 [hereinafter West, Critical
Social Theory]; see also Goldfarb, From the Worlds of "Others," supra note 2.
4. See, eg., Mark Tushnet & Jennifer Jaff, Critical Legal Studies and Criminal Proce-
dure, 35 CATH. U. L. REv. 361, 361 (1986). For more detailed descriptions of the relationship
between critical legal studies and legal realism, see Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J.
Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars The Unfolding Drama of American
Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. R v. 199, 204 (1984); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An
Introduction to its Origins and Underpinnings; 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505, 505-10 (1986); Note,
'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95
HARV. L. Rv. 1669 (1982); see also Joseph Williams Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L.
REv. 465 (1988).
5. See Tushnet & Jafl, supra note 4, at 361; see also JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND at viii (1949) (describing the preoccupations of the "rule skeptics").
6. Although they do not link clinical legal education and fact skepticism, Tushnet and
Jaff implicitly recognize the link when they describe a broad law-in-action approach as the
contemporary version of fact skepticism. Tushnet & Jaff, supra note 4, at 376-77. Their de-
scription of the law-in-action approach, however, bears little resemblance to clinical education.
See infra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
7. See Tushnet & Jal, supra note 4, at 361. Jerome Frank's description of fact skepti-
cism is far more graphic:
[T]he fact skeptics go much further [than the rule skeptics]. Their primary interest is
in the trial courts. No matter how precise or definite may be the formal legal rules,
say these fact skeptics, no matter what the discoverable uniformities behind these
formal rules, nevertheless it is impossible, and will always be impossible, because of
the elusiveness of the facts on which decisions turn, to predict future decisions in
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links of clinical legal education and critical legal studies to related
branches of legal realism suggest that the two movements have overlap-
ping concerns that may recommend greater institutional awareness, com-
munication, and cross-development.
L The Relationship of Clinical Legal Theory to Critical Legal
Theory
A. Clinical Legal Theory
[A]lthough the lawyer may not always be aware of it, in his day-
to-day tasks of counselling, planning and contending, he is engaged in
activities that philosophy-as well as such related disciplines as psy-
chology and sociology-has long sought to analyze and illuminate....
In view of this, it is curious that those concerned with law have not
more fully exploited the wealth of available philosophical-and related
theoretical-literature.8
A lawyer's ordinary professional decisions contain political and
moral content.9 In their daily practice, "lawyers amend, abrogate, and
enforce the law, and in the process, determine much of law's meaning for
persons who come in contact with it."lo The multitude of assumptions
most (not all) lawsuits, not yet begun or not yet tried .... [W]hen pivotal testimony
at the trial is oral and conflicting, as it is in most lawsuits, the trial court's "finding"
of the facts involves a multitude of elusive factors: First the trial judge in a non-jury
trial or the jury in a jury trial must learn about the facts from the witnesses; and
witnesses, being humanly fallible, frequently make mistakes in observation of what
they saw and heard, or in their recollections of what they observed, or in their court-
room reports of those recollections. Second, the trial judges or juries, also human,
may have prejudices-often unconscious, unknown even to themselves-for or
against some of the witnesses, or the parties to the suit, or the lawyers.
Those prejudices, when they are racial, religious, political, or economic, may
sometimes be surmised by others. But there are some hidden, unconscious biases of
trial judges or jurors .... Concealed and highly idiosyncratic, such biases-peculiar
to each individual judge or juror--cannot be formulated as uniformities or squeezed
into regularized "behavior patterns." In that respect, neither judges nor jurors are
standardized.
The chief obstacle to prophesying a trial-court decision is, then, the inability,
thanks to these inscrutable factors, to foresee what a particular trial judge or jury will
believe to be the facts.
FRANK, supra note 5, at xi-xiii.
8. WILLIAM R. BISHIN & CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE AND ETHICS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL METHOD at vii (1972).
9. See, e.g., Robert J. Condlin, "Tastes Great, Less Filling': The Law School Clinic and
Political Critique, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 45, 51-52 (1986) (contending that the concept of lawyer-
ing skill has meaning only in a normative context); William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in
Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REv. 469, 504-05 (1984) (arguing that lawyers' practical judg-
ments and compromises are meaningless apart from theories of how society is structured and
what it permits).
10. Condlin, supra note 9, at 48.
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and biases, values and norms, embedded in law's workings renders this
an inevitable process, though it remains largely unexamined and
unarticulated. 11
Clinical legal education, with one foot in academia and the other in
the practice of law, 12 represents an ideal vantage point from which to
scrutinize conventional lawyers' practices13 and bring the theories that
prefigure them into conscious awareness. 14 Only after realizing and con-
fronting these new theories can one endeavor to improve them and, as a
consequence, improve the practice of law.15 The examination of one's
own law practice-a practice that can contribute to the furtherance or
frustration of substantive justice-provides a firm experiential ground
from which to consider philosophical conceptions of justice, fairness, and
equality.1 6
Exploring these philosophical considerations from the perspective of
one's own lawyering is the subject of clinical education. This choice of
subject matter pours practical content into otherwise abstract and elusive
norms. Through this process, clinical education helps to establish condi-
tions essential for understanding and reforming legal practice and the
legal system. This endeavor reveals ethical concerns and has powerful
ethical implications.1 7
11. Examples of important efforts to examine the moral assumptions and implications of
lawyering include William H. Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy: Procedural Justice and Profes-
sional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. Rnv. 30, and Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals:
Some Moral Issues, 5 HuM. RTS. 1 (1975).
12. Although clinical legal education can take many forms, I am using that label in this
Essay to represent its original and most typical meaning: a law office setting affiliated with a
law school course in which students, under supervision, represent indigent clients. Bob
Condlin describes this clinical model asprimum interparia. See Condlin, supra note 9, at 46.
13. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Legacy of Clinical Education: Theories about
Lawyering, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 555, 556 (1980).
14. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Kreiling, Clinical Education and Lawyer Competency: The Pro-
cess of Learning to Learn from Experience Through Properly Structured Clinical Supervision,
40 MD. L. Rnv. 284, 290-91 (1981) (contending that lawyers' "theories of action" depend
upon: (1) assumptions-relevant stated or unstated suppositions or beliefs, (2) governing vari-
ables-the factors within individuals' control such as the level of anxiety and time expended,
(3) core values-criteria upon which basic behavioral choices are made, and (4) action strate-
gies-rules for taking action in recurrent situations).
15. Id. at 289-95.
16. See Condlin, supra note 9, stating:
One can have normative theories about the proper performance of lawyer practices,
and theories about how lawyer practices contribute to the justice of the legal system
as a whole.... The ability to judge day-to-day law practice against... standards of
justice and fairness is an essential quality of a good citizen and a good lawyer.
Id. at 48, 50-51 (footnote omitted).
17. See, e.g., Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral. The Ethics of Feminism and
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When clinical educators define their subject matter this broadly,
clinical education can enhance the relationship between legal theory and
legal practice. In the hands of clinical educators, experience can generate
theory which can circle back to inform experience, which in turn can
alter, refine, and improve the theory. In sum, clinical legal education
contains an implicit epistemological theory, and its theory is inseparable
from its practice. 18
Clinical education also represents a useful vantage point from which
to examine other theories of law. In a previous article I sought to illumi-
nate feminist legal theory from the perspective of clinical education and,
conversely, to illuminate clinical education from the perspective of femi-
nist theory. 19 I argued that despite differences in focus, clinical educa-
tion and feminist theory-both alternative viewpoints to traditional legal
methods-represent compatible enterprises.20 So too might clinical edu-
cation illuminate ideas commonly associated with the cls movement, and
the simultaneous consideration of each promises to generate new insights
into the role of law and legal processes in daily life.
B. Relationship to Critical Legal Theory
The cls literature develops, among other things, a theory of law as
legitimation, exposing the manner in which law reflects and creates a
social organization built on inequities of power and wealth. Cls theorists
have suggested that legitimation works through methods of legal reason-
ing. By addressing social conflicts through doctrine, the legal system
projects an image of disinterested arbiters who fairly resolve conflicts
through the inexorable logic of neutral doctrinal principles.21
In this manner, legal culture induces acquiescence to institutional
structures that are built on the values of liberal capitalism while obscur-
ing recognition that these values are preordained choices derived from a
particular set of power relations.22 Importing methods of deconstruction
Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1599 (1991) [hereinafter Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice
Spiral].
18. Id; cf Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773,
1774 (1987) (arguing that theory is rooted in practice but performs a narrow and limited role
in understanding practices). For a critique of Fish's constricted use of the concept of "the-
ory," see Brook Thomas, Stanley Fish and the Uses of Basebalk The Return of the Natural, 2
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 59 (1990).
19. See, e.g., Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral, supra note 17.
20. Id. at 1667-74.
21. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF
LAv: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 281 (David Kairys ed., 1982) [hereinafter THE POLMCS OF
LAW].
22. Id. at 281-92.
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from critical literary theory, cls has sought to reveal the inherent indeter-
minacy of the categories and values underlying legal thought and, thus,
the logical instability of the choices made by our legal culture.23
Through these methods, cls proponents hope to engender an intellectual
climate conducive to constructing a world of less hierarchy and more
substantive justice.24
In this description of critical legal theory, one can hear a resonance
with clinical legal theory. Like clinical educators, critical legal scholars
seek to illuminate the assumptions, biases, values, and norms embedded
in law's workings in order to heighten awareness of the political and
moral choices made by lawyers and the legal system.25 Although critical
legal theorists focus more on legal doctrine and clinical legal theorists on
legal practice, both work to make conscious the tacit theories that the
legal system embodies and expresses. Each movement conducts this pro-
ject in the interest of remaking these theories conform more closely with
visions of a fairer society.26
In other words, both cls advocates and clinical legal educators are
engaged in a project of "theoretical deconstruction. '27 Each movement
hopes that such a project will generate a climate favorable to social
change. Although the cls approach to the project is more self-con-
23. See, e.g., Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE
L.J. 997, 1005-09 (1985); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1363, 1364-65
(1984).
24. See, e.g., Drucilla Cornell, Toward A Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics.
133 U. PA. L. REV. 291 (1985); Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism
and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); see also Alan D. Freeman, Truth and Mystification
in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1229, 1230 (1981) ("The point of delegitimation is to ex-
pose possibilities more truly expressing reality, possibilities of fashioning a future that might at
least partially realize a substantive notion ofjustice .... ).
25. See, e.g., Mary Joe Frug, Securing Job Equality for VWomen: Labor Market Hostility
to Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L. REv. 55 (1979); Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist
Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. Rav. 387 (1984).
26. See, e.g., Condlin, supra note 9 (clinical education); Karl E. Mjare, Judicial Deradi-
calization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 193 7-1941, 62
MINN. L. Rv. 265 (1978) (critical legal theory).
In this Essay, I am using the word "theory" in the sense that Mark Spiegel has used it: as
a "set of general propositions used as an explanation ... sufficiently abstract to be relevant to
more than just particularized situations." Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Educa-
tion: An Essay On Clinical Education, 34 UCLA L. Rav. 577, 580 (1987) (footnote omitted).
This is a broader definition than Fish employs. See Fish, supra note 18, at 1779 (defining
theory as "an abstract or algorithmic formulation that guides or governs practice from a posi-
tion outside any particular conception of practice").
27. Although the term "deconstruction" derives from the work of Jacques Derrida and
other critical literary theorists, see, e.g., Richard Rorty, Deconstruction and Circumvention, 11
CRrrICAL INQUIRY 1, 16 (1984), the use of the qualifying adjective "theoretical" is a reference
to Cook, supra note 2, at 988.
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sciously political in content than the clinical approach (a basis on which
critical theorists have powerfully critiqued clinical education),28 each ap-
proach is motivated by ethical sensibilities and sparked by an interest in
ameliorating injustice.
II. Critical Legal Studies and Criminal Procedure
A promising start for the development of a clinical perspective on
critical legal theory involves examining a text from the perspective of
each movement, thereby providing an opportunity to compare and con-
trast approaches. Mark Tushnet and Jennifer Jaff's Critical Legal Stud-
ies and Criminal Procedure, published in the Catholic University Law
Review,2 9 facilitates this methodology. The article chooses a text, the
Supreme Court's opinion in the case of Bordenkircher v. Hayes,30 and
offers some initial possibilities on how critical legal thinkers would ana-
lyze the case and the problem of criminal procedure that it confronts:
prosecutorial vindictiveness in the plea bargaining context. From the
perspective of clinical education, I will assess the approach offered in that
article, then describe how a student and a professor involved in a crimi-
nal clinical program might encounter and address the same procedural
issue.
A. Bordenkircher v. Hayes
Tushnet and Jaff use Bordenkircher v. Hayes to develop and illus-
trate the concept of indeterminacy. They recite the facts of the case as
follows. 31 Paul Hayes was charged with passing a bad check in the
amount of $88.30.32 His prior record included a sexual assault commit-
ted more than ten years earlier, when he was seventeen, for which he had
served five years in a reformatory. The record also included a robbery
committed several years before the current charge, for which he had
served five years on probation. The prosecutor offered Hayes a five year
sentence in exchange for a guilty plea on the bad check charge. If Hayes
did not plead guilty, the prosecutor indicated that he would have him
28. See, ag., William H. Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism,
32 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1980) (criticizing "psychological vision" for failing to confront the
political character of law and legal practice). For a clinician's reply that Simon's critique is
unfairly reductive, see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 13, at 565 n.61.
29. Tushnet & Jaff, supra note 4.
30. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
31. Tushnet & Jaff, supra note 4, at 362.
32. The actual charge was "uttering a forged instrument," Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at
358, a more serious offense than the words "passing a bad check," with the implication of
knowingly writing a check on insufficient funds, might lead the reader to conclude.
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indicted under the state's habitual criminal statute, which provided for a
mandatory life sentence to be imposed on a third-time felon. Hayes did
not accept the plea offer. As threatened, the prosecutor indicted Hayes
as a habitual criminal. Hayes was convicted and received a life sentence.
On appeal, Hayes claimed that the prosecutor's bargaining tactics
violated due process by penalizing him for exercising his constitutional
right to trial. The Supreme Court, split five-four, rejected this argument,
finding the prosecutor's actions to be a legitimate outgrowth of a system
largely dependent on plea bargaining. Some of the dissenters were trou-
bled, among other things, by the fact that the habitual offender statute
had been repealed by the time the Supreme Court heard the case.33 The
original statute had been replaced by one under which Hayes' first con-
viction was disqualified from enhancing his sentence because he was
under eighteen at the time of the offense. Therefore, under the prevailing
law, his maximum prison exposure was far less than the life sentence he
had in fact received.
B. The Critique of Formalism
Having selected these facts from the Supreme Court's already ex-
purgated facts, Tushnet and Jaff demonstrate that no set of general prin-
ciples-that is, no version of legal formalism-inexorably leads to the
result in Bordenkircher, or, by extension, to the result in any case. They
offer several versions of legal formalism to illustrate this contention, ex-
plaining how each set of principles could lead to the result in
Bordenkircher or to its opposite.34 Their understanding of formalism is
quite broad, encompassing not only the standard target of other cls writ-
ing-classical doctrinal formalism-but also formalisms based on princi-
ples of moral philosophy, law and economics, and the sociology of the
professions.35 Moreover, the authors are careful to indicate that their list
does not exhaust the field of formalisms that one might invoke to address
a criminal procedure issue.36
(1) Doctrine
Tushnet and Jaff develop most fully the familiar cls critique of class-
ical doctrinal formalism, demonstrating how following the logic of prin-
33. Tushnet & Jaff, supra note 4, at 362 n.5.
34. I at 363-76.
35. Id.
36. "Thus, on any set of formalist premises-four have been examined, but the critique
claims that if someone came up with another one, the proposition would follow as well-
Bordenkircher was decided rightly, but it was also decided wrongly." Id at 376.
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ciples established in prior precedents leads to contradictory results.3 7
The result one achieves depends entirely on which set of relevant prece-
dents one chooses. The precedents disapproving of prosecutorial vindic-
tiveness in retaliation for a defendant's exercise of constitutional rights
are motivated by a concern for fairness in individual cases and lead to the
conclusion that Hayes' argument should prevail. On the other hand, the
precedents generally approving of plea bargaining focus on protecting an
important aspect of a larger systemic design and lead to the conclusion
that a prosecutor's insistence on the exchange of constitutional rights for
sentencing benefits represents legitimate bargaining. According to the
latter set of precedents, the Supreme Court decided correctly. In pursu-
ing our doctrinal analyses, nothing directs us to prefer individual protec-
tion over systemic protection, or vice versa. Nor would such direction
cleanly resolve the indeterminacy dilemma, since one can construct indi-
vidual and systemic arguments in support of each result.
(2) Moral Philosophy
Tushnet and Jaff use a similar style of analysis to demonstrate the
indeterminacy of each of the other brands of formalism. A moral philos-
opher might argue that deduction from fundamental philosophical prin-
ciples leads to a particular result in Bordenkircher. By contrast, the
authors demonstrate how a theory of free will in plea bargaining can lead
equally to one conclusion or to its opposite, depending on how free will is
constructed,38 how one evaluates the constraints under which plea bar-
gaining occurs, and whether one views bargaining as occurring inside or
outside the adversary system.39 Similarly, using a theory of retribution,
one can argue either against habitual offender statutes that permit dispro-
portionate punishment for a subsequent offense or in support of habitual
offender statutes when appropriate retribution appears not to have been
exacted for the underlying offenses.40
(3) Law and Economics
Likewise, using law and economics principles, one would treat plea
bargaining as a market system that reaches "socially optimal" results
through the self-interested negotiations of each party. Regulations
37. Id. at 363-67.
38. For example, one might construct a defendant's choice to accept or reject a plea offer
as an exercise of free will. However, due to the sentencing discount typically foregone by
rejection of a plea offer, one might consider the encumbrances imposed on a defendant's choice
to be so considerable as to undermine the possibility of free will. See id. at 368-69.
39. Id. at 368-69.
40. Id. at 370.
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would interfere with the effective functioning of the plea market, and
argue against Hayes' position that the court should prohibit certain nego-
tiation strategies of one party.4 1 On the other hand, Tushnet and Jaff
identify flaws in the plea market, supporting the notion that the prohibi-
tion of certain negotiation strategies will improve market performance.
Among them, for example, is the recognition that a prosecutor's prefer-
ences are not coterminous with the preferences of society's law-abiding
citizens, and that those working and residing in correctional institutions,
not prosecutors, feel the direct effects of a prosecutor's insistence on un-
duly harsh pleas.42 Consequently, a prosecutor may seek suboptimally
high pleas with excessive social costs.
(4) Organization Theory
Finally, Tushnet and Jaff examine the principles of organization the-
ory--or, in their words, the sociology of the professions-which lead to
results that "make life easiest for the repeat players in the system. '43
The unrestricted plea bargaining that Bordenkircher permits promotes
the interests of criminal justice professionals, such as prosecutors, de-
fenders, and judges, by generating a higher number of pleas. On the
other hand, the authors observe that if the criminal justice participants
view their professional interests as aided by defendants' beliefs that they
have been treated fairly--certainly, correctional officials are likely to
view their own interests in this way-then Bordenkircher should have
come out the other way.44
The formalism of the sociology of the professions, like all other for-
malisms, cannot locate general principles that lead us down the path of
logical necessity to a particular destination. No metaframework is avail-
able to help us choose the right principles from which to begin the analy-
sis.45 Therefore, according to the authors, all forms of formalism leave
us afloat. This argument represents the contemporary version of legal
realism's rule skepticism.
41. Id at 370-71. In this section Tushnet and Jaff draw on Frank H. Easterbrook, Crimi-
nal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983).
42. Tushnet & Jaff, supra note 4, at 373.
43. Id. at 374.
44. Id. at 375.
45. "If we shift the frame-from the individual to the systemic level, from abstract moral
philosophy to specific institutions, and so on-we can produce alternative results. Yet neither
the formalisms nor any metatheory specifies what frame we should use." Id. at 376.
[Vol. 43
BEYOND CUT FLOWERS
III. Clinical Response to the Article
How might a participant in a criminal clinic view Tushnet and Jails
article? From the standpoint of a clinician in the midst of daily practice,
their arguments, though skillfully presented, border on the inconsequen-
tial. Only from the standpoint of the academy, where traditional legal
views can hold great sway, and where the predominant teaching methods
often implicitly endorse the norms of formalism, are such arguments
likely to gain influence.46
A. Informalism
Formalism has a weak grasp in clinical settings because clinics func-
tion in the midst of "informalism." 47 Clinical participants regularly con-
front the phenomena, played out by a variety of criminal justice actors,
that combine with or override doctrine in determining the outcomes of
cases. Far too often, clinical students have had the experience of entering
court secure in the knowledge that the law is squarely on their client's
side, only to face a judge who rules against the client. Occasionally, they
have experienced feeling that the law leans against them but that power-
ful equities lie on their side, offering hope of a favorable resolution. In
some cases clinical students can voice their own arguments as well as
their opponent's arguments, finding each set independently persuasive.
In a vivid, immediate, and sometimes intuitive way, clinical students hear
the message of doctrine's indeterminacy.
Perhaps long-suffering formalists will not hear the message in the
clear tones that Tushnet and Jaff would have them hear it. Anyone suffi-
ciently invested in a particular point of view can resist the call of an-
46. Duncan Kennedy has elaborated a biting critique of traditional legal education. See
Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLrTICS OF LAW,
supra note 21, at 40. I mean to suggest only that the convention of traditional doctrinal teach-
ing, when it provides no social or historical context for understanding black letter law, conveys
a tacit endorsement of formalist explanations of law's meaning. Although not all academic
law is taught according to this convention, my point is simply that where it is so taught,
Tushnet and Jaff's critique has most force. In other contexts, like a clinical context, their
critique is less useful.
47. Jerome Frank describes the "unserenity" that characterizes trial court practice: "[A
trial] courtroom is, as Wigmore notes, 'a place of ... distracting episodes, and sensational
surprises.' The drama there, full of interruptions, is turbulently conducted, punctuated by
constant clashes between counsel and witnesses or between counsel." FRANK, supra note 5, at
xxix. This description, vivid though it is, omits all of the even less stylized and therefore more
unpredictable, informal, and varied interactions that are involved in handling a case prior to
trial. Frank has referred to the interactions that construct the "atmosphere" of a case as "the
rough-and-tumble activities of the average lawyer's life." See Jerome Frank, Why Not a
Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 908 (1933).
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other.48 But participants in a clinic all too quicdy realize that people,
not the doctrines they invoke, make legal judgments. 49 These clinical
experiences may lead to insights about how a decisionmaker's world view
informs legal outcomes. 50 Nevertheless, in the first example cited above
the student could view the judge as simply refusing to apply the "cor-
rect" formal doctrine. The student might believe that formalism is right,
but that the judge is a maverick who, due to his or her own aberrant
values or psychological proffle, has failed to abide by it, and thereby
made the wrong decision. In the second example the student may see the
sympathetic nature of the client's case as a factor that can unduly influ-
ence a judge to reach an individually desirable, but formally incorrect
result. In the last example the student's interpretation of the ease with
which she articulates opposing arguments may be that the case is very
close. She may feel that her lack of experience renders her unable to
determine the better formal result.
Some shades of truth may inhere in these students' positions, in spite
of their superficial appearance. But little turns on that possibility, be-
48. Many authors have described the way in which pre-existing views can distort percep-
tions. See, eg., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 24, 25 (1982) (describing how "theory can blind observation");
John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure, of A Third "'Model" of the Criminal Process, 79
YALE L.J. 359, 359 n.1 (1970) (Ideology is "that set of beliefs, assumptions, categories of
understanding, and the like, which affect and determine the structure of perception."); Michael
Moore, Moral Reality, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1061, 1110 ("We [unconsciously] correct perception
constantly, in light of our antecedently held background beliefs about how the world is."). For
thoughtful expositions of how confrontations with discrepant data can nevertheless alter one's
world view, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REv. 829
(1990); Howard Lesnick, The Wellsprings of Legal Responses to Inequality: A Perspective on
Perspectives, 1991 DUKE L.J. 413; Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword:
Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REv. 10 (1987).
49. Richard Boldt has reminded me that clinical students may explain the nonformalist
outcomes that they observe by marginalizing their own experiences of representing poor peo-
ple: "this is just poor people's law." The use of classroom materials, especially empirical or
ethnographic materials about lawyering for nonindigent clients, can help enlarge the students'
set of experiences and challenge this otherwise easily reached conclusion. See Richard Boldt &
Marc Feldman, The Faces of Law in Theory and Practice: Doctrine, Rhetoric, and Social Con-
text, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1111 (1992).
50. See, e.g., Lesnick, supra note 48, at 440 (Although "legal principles are [not] wholly
indeterminate," and "a judge's perception of the world through a particular perspective is [not]
wholly determinative of outcomes ... a significant channeling goes on," and "a judge's re-
sponse to one legal issue may parallel his or her response to another, doctrinally unrelated
one."). Lesnick views this observation as "moderate," "measured," and "supported by the
experience of nearly all practitioners." Id. at 440 n.52. Clinical students who observe the
influence of decisionmakers' world views on legal outcomes would do well to consider how
particular lawyering choices might challenge the pre-existing views that could work to their
clients' detriment. See Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral, supra note 17, at 1684-86. The
detrimental pre-existing views might even belong to the students themselves. Id. at 1677-83.
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cause these are precisely the sorts of issues that clinical students and
clinical teachers can discuss. In these discussions doctrine's indetermi-
nacy-or the guidance of moral philosophy, cost-benefit analyses, organi-
zational theory, or some other framework-is the question rather than
the answer. Clinical students and clinical teachers arrive at their tenta-
tive answers only after an extended period of empiricism and dialogue.
As a result, their answers will look right, feel right, and conform to their
experiences, reducing the likelihood that they will be persuaded by argu-
ments working solely on an analytic level.
B. Nihilism
Learning about the indeterminacy of legal formalism through ana-
lytic routes alone poses particular dangers. Although not a necessary
conclusion of the indeterminacy claim, the charge of nihilism can be lev-
eled easily, especially by those who feel threatened by the loss of analytic
landmarks.5 1 Moreover, the trap of nihilism can ensnare a vulnerable
young law student. If all first principles lead us anywhere and nowhere,
why have any?
If they wish, Tushnet and Jagf, with some difficulty, can defend
themselves against the nihilism charge. More importantly, they can help
the vulnerable young law student resist nihilism's pull. The authors can
argue that when we are unconstrained by the false determinism of for-
malism, we are free to choose and defend our first principles and to argue
for the good to which they may lead. While trying to remain aware of
our own position's imperfections, we can strive for values we deem wor-
thy and seek to persuade others of their merit.52
The difficulties of constructing this position analytically can be more
demanding than constructing it experientially. The awareness of law's
indeterminacy does not block a clinical student's view of the harm that
people suffer and the help that legal decisionmakers can provide. It can-
not prevent clinical participants from standing for something, as they
must, because they are standing with someone who needs their legal
assistance.
51. See, eg., Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 226-27
(1984) (arguing that critical legal theorists are nihilists who do not belong in the legal acad-
emy). For a discussion of other scholars' attacks on critical legal theorists, see Sanford Levin-
son, On Dworkin, Kennedy, and Ely: Decoding the Legal Past, 51 PARTISAN REv. 248 (1984).
52. See, eg., Singer, supra note 24; cf John Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100
HARV. L. REV. 332 (1986) (criticizing the use of nihilism by some cls adherents as an episte-
mological critique of law and legal theory).
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At least sometimes, the position that we take in these clinical cir-
cumstances will appear socially desirable in a broad sense. Articulating
why that seems true and how it differs from instances in which the oppo-
site seems to hold is an important analytic exercise.5 3 Furthermore, the
exercise has an especially acute lesson when it coincides with the recogni-
tion of law's indeterminacy. The lesson is this: the fact that we cannot
prove the truth of what we know does not preclude us from asserting
truth or truly knowing it.54 Nor does it mean that we cannot act to allay
the human suffering that we observe. The difference between the clinical
participant and the critical legal studies proponent, each aware of law's
indeterminacy and faced with the problem of prosecutorial vindictiveness
in plea bargaining, is that the clinical student is obliged to do something
in the situation in which that problem arises.
C. Inductive and Deductive Reasoning
Clinical legal theory as practiced in law school clinics combines in-
ductive and deductive reasoning, whereas critical legal theory of the vari-
ety offered by Tushnet and Jaff exhibits greater dependence on deductive
approaches. In this sense, critical legal theory has often been structurally
similar to, though substantively divergent from, the mainstream legal
theory that it attacks.55 Each has often relied on abstract analyses of
doctrines that emerge from appellate case law to construct different con-
clusions. Although critical legal theorists use the methods of traditional
case analysis to demonstrate their inadequacy, these theorists can become
mired in the demonstration, never moving beyond that well-traveled
terrain.
Clinical educators would challenge the cls preoccupation with anal-
ysis of appellate cases as a vehicle for developing an understanding of the
53. See Condlin, supra note 9, at 48-51.
54. This seemingly paradoxical conclusion is similar to that drawn by authors writing
from other alternative perspectives-e.g., feminist, humanist, communitarian-outside of
clinical settings. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 48, at 880-84 (A "positional" stance on truth
"conceives of truth as situated and partial," acknowledging "the existence of empirical truths,
values and knowledge, and also their contingency."); Mark Edmundson, The Ethics of Decon-
struction, 27 MICH Q. REv. 622, 635 (1988) (Belief is "provisional," "open to revision" but
"for the time being, committed."); Jerry Frug, Argument as Character, 40 STAN. L. REv. 869,
876 (1988) (The awareness that answers to important questions are "tentative and contesta-
ble," does not make them "meaningless or arbitrary."); Lesnick, supra note 48, at 445-46 (The
realization that one's world view is always "up for grabs," helps us "hold on more securely, yet
less tightly, to our most basic beliefs.").
55. Cf FRANK, supra note 5, at xii (arguing that because the rule skeptics focus solely on
"upper-court decisions," they are "but the left-wing adherents of a tradition. It is from the
tradition itself that the fact skeptics revolted.").
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43
BEYOND CUT FLOWERS
legal system.56 Rather, they would examine how shifting the focus to the
multidimensional world of law-in-operation might affect one's insights
and explanations of legal phenomena.5 7 Choosing analysis of appellate
cases as a primary method of understanding law ties critical scholars too
closely to a particular set of power relations 58 and thereby limits the
scope, and perhaps the accuracy, of their social theory. 59 This method
56. Jerome Frank's critique of legal education poses an equally apt challenge to those
who focus primarily on appellate cases:
[They do not study case. They do not even study the printed records of cases
(although that would be little enough), let alone cases as living processes. Their at-
tention is restricted to judicial opinions. But an opinion is not a decision. A decision
is a specific judgment, or order or decree entered after a trial of a specific lawsuit
between specific litigants.
* It is absurd that we should continue to call an upper court opinion a case. It
is at most an adjunct to the final step in a case (i.e., an essay published by an upper
court in justification of its decision).
Frank, supra note 47, at 910-16 (emphasis in original).
57. This was Frank's prescription for legal education generally. Id at 916 ("Law stu-
dents should be given the opportunity to see legal operations. Their study of cases should be
supplemented by frequent visits, accompanied by law teachers, to both trial and appellate
courts.") (emphasis in original).
58. Cf FRANK, supra note 5:
[Miost of the rule skeptics, restricting themselves to the upper-court level, live in an
artificial two-dimensional legal world, while the legal world of the fact skeptics is
three-dimensional. Obviously, many events occurring in the fact skeptics' three-di-
mensional cosmos are out of sight, and therefore out of mind, in the rule skeptics'
cosmos.
The critical anti-skeptics also live in the artificial upper-court world.
Id at xi-xii.
59. [Rule] skeptics cold-shoulder the trial courts. Yet in most instances, these skep-
tics do not inform their readers that they are writing chiefly of upper courts....
When a trial court, relying on inaccurate testimony, misapprehends the real
facts, it decides an unreal, hypothetical case. An upper court is still more likely to do
so; for, further removed from the real facts, it usually uses, perforce, the trial court's
version of the facts as something "given." As the trial courts in most cases have an
uncontrollable power ("discretion") to choose the facts-that is, to choose to believe
one witness rather than another-those courts, not the upper courts, play the chief
role in court-house government. All of which goes to expose the fallacy of the Up-
per-Court Myth....
[W]hat does it mean to say that the facts of a case are substantially similar to
those of an earlier case? It means, at most, merely that the trial court regards the
facts of the two cases as about the same. Since, however, no one knows what the trial
court will find as the facts, no one can guess what precedent ought to be or will be
followed either by the trial court or, if an appeal occurs, by the upper court. This
weakness of the precedent doctrine becomes more obvious when one takes into ac-
count the "composite" factor, the intertwining of rules and facts in the trial court's
decision.
This weakness will also infect any substitute precedent system, based on "real
rules" which the rule skeptics may discover, by way of anthropology-i.e., the mo-
res, customs, folkways--or psychology, or statistics, or studies of the political, eco-
nomic, and social backgrounds of judges, or otherwise. For no rule can be
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renders critical legal theorists, like traditional legal theorists, vulnerable
to Jerome Frank's concern that the law school's predominant focus on
appellate cases is analogous to teaching horticulture by using only cut
flowers. 60
In contrast, clinical legal theorists seek to study flowers as they
grow, a demanding method that brings them into contact with the myr-
iad, intricate phenomena that nurture or impede floral growth. Yet no
other method offers promise of a fuller understanding of the dynamics of
flowering. No matter how many species of cut flowers one scrutinizes or
the number and variety of patterns such scrutiny uncovers, one can only
come to know flowers broadly and deeply by coming to know them in the
complex habitats in which they have taken root. Understanding flowers,
then, requires understanding flowers-in-relation to sun, rain, wind, pests,
weeds, humans, and all other forces of interaction. One cannot forego an
inductive method of analysis-close observation and broad information
gathering before drawing conclusions about the dynamics of law and
lawyering-when, like flowering, one's subject matter interacts with so
many other phenomena.
D. Challenging Assumptions
Another advantage of studying law in the practice environments in
which one experiences its workings, when contrasted with an abstract
appellate case approach, is that one's pre-existing assumptions, some of
them erroneous, are more likely to become visible.61 Tushnet and Jalfs
article contains several examples of assumptions that are likely to face
challenges when confronting the everyday realities of criminal practice.
For example, the authors, while recognizing the existence of innocent
hermetically sealed against the intrusion of false or inaccurate oral testimony which
the trial judge or jury may believe .... Anyone who has ever watched a jury trial
knows the rules often become a mere subsidiary detail, part of a meaningless but
dignified liturgy recited by the judge in the physical presence of the jury and to which
the jury pays scant heed.
Id. at xi-viii (citation omitted).
60. Frank, supra note 47, at 912.
61. See, e.g., Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral, supra note 17, at 1648-51; Kreiling,
supra note 14, at 289-95. Although he is speaking of interdisciplinary education generally
rather than clinical education specifically, James Boyd White makes a similar observation:
An important consequence of this kind of study is that it would bring to the
center of consciousness, where it could be studied and criticized, the assumptions
underlying the culture of law and of our larger culture; this in turn might enable us
better to perform our lawyers' functions of cultural criticism and transformation.
James Boyd White, Doctrine in a Vacuum: Reflections On What A Law School Ought (And
Ought Not) To Be, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155, 165 (1986).
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defendants, 62 endorse the assumption that "almost all defendants are fac-
tually guilty" 63 or have "committed the crimes with which they are
charged." 64
Most clinic students enter criminal clinical programs with this as-
sumption as well. Yet many leave these programs with a far more com-
plicated view. The number of apparently innocent clients is often higher
than they supposed, 65 the number who present facts about which they
are genuinely uncertain is far greater,66 and even when they feel as if they
can largely reconstruct the pertinent events that underlie the charges, the
degree of factual and philosophical complexity often makes the issue of
guilt or innocence fundamentally ambiguous.67
It is more difficult to imagine this ambiguity than to face it. But
facing it requires opening oneself to the experience of criminal casework.
While making this choice need not be a prerequisite to speaking about
these matters, at least some vicarious experience, perhaps through liter-
ary or ethnographic accounts68 or through factually rich empirical re-
search,69 may be necessary to inform one's opinions on criminal justice
issues.
In another passage of their article Tushnet and Jaff again reveal a
tendency to construct defendants stereotypically. In describing the insti-
tutional bias in favor of plea bargaining, the authors assert that
"[d]efendants, especially recidivists like Hayes,... know this[,]" and this
62. Tushnet & Jaff, supra note 4, at 371 n.47, 376.
63. Id. at 366 n.20.
64. Id, at 371.
65. See, eg., John B. Mitchell, The Ethics of the Criminal Defense Attorney-New An-
swers to Old Questions, 32 STAN. L. REv. 293, 293 (1980) (expressing the view that a surprising
number of the more than 600 defendants whom the author represented had not committed the
crimes for which they were charged). Perhaps one of the reasons for widespread acceptance of
a contrary view is the media's simplistic depiction of law enforcers versus criminals as good
versus bad. For a discussion of the ideological influence of media portrayals, see JOHN B.
THOMPSON, IDEOLOGY AND MODERN CULTURE: CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY IN THE ERA OF
MASS COMMUNICATION (1990).
66. See Frank, supra note 47, at 919 ("The student should become aware of the slippery
character of 'the facts' of a case.").
67. For a discussion indicating that individual guilt or innocence is not a descriptive
dichotomy, but an ideological choice that does not enhance understanding of moral character,
see generally Michael Bayles, Character, Purpose and Criminal Responsibility, in 1 LAW &
PHIL. 5 (1982); Richard C. Boldt, Restitution, Criminal Law, and the Ideology of Individuality,
77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 969 (1986); John 0. Cole, Thoughts From the Land ofAnd, 39
MERCER L. Rnv. 907, 914-19 (1988).
68. See, eg., NORMAN MAILER, THE EXECUTIONER'S SONG (1979) (a study of the case
of Gary Gilmore, executed in 1977).
69. See, eg., EMPIRICAL THEORIES ABOUT COURTS (Keith 0. Boyum & Lynn Mather
eds., 1983); MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS,
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATrORNEYS (1978).
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knowledge constrains their freedom of choice about pleading guilty. 70
On what basis, other than popular (mis)conceptions, do they rely? Not
only is every defendant-including first offenders, the retarded, and the
mentally ill-deemed knowledgeable about this aspect of the system, but
Hayes, a person whose traits are completely unknown to us, is deemed to
be an especially knowledgeable recidivist.
Hayes has been convicted of three different offenses spanning more
than a decade. By criminal justice standards, he is not a frequent of-
fender, for he spends years at a time without running into criminal
trouble. Moreover, the fact that three offenses appear on his record tells
us little about the merits of those charges, given the systemic bias toward
convictions71 and the documented inadequacies of the criminal defense
bar, particularly of overburdened public defenders and undertrained and
underfunded appointed counsel.72
Nevertheless, three convictions in more than a decade lead Tushnet
and Jaff to assume that Hayes' experiences, about which we know noth-
ing, made him a particularly knowledgeable defendant. In our culture
this stereotype is easily learned and sometimes accurate, such that it is
70. Tushnet & Jaff, supra note 4, at 368. Tushnet and Jaff overlook the fact that a recidi-
vist statute, such as that passed since Hayes' last contact with the criminal justice system,
dramatically skews the incentive structure surrounding plea bargaining.
71. See, e.g., Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and theAccused: Balance of Advantage in
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960) (providing considerable support, through pro-
cedural examples, for the claim that institutional arrangements in the criminal process aggra-
vate the prosecutions' disproportionate advantage).
72. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright et al., Keeping Gideon From Being Blown Away, CRIua.
JusT., Winter 1990, at 10; Richard Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel
The Impact on Competent Representation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C. L. REv. 531, 547
(1988); Richard Klein, Legal Malpractice, Professional Discipline, and Representation of the
Indigent Defendant, 61 TEMP. L. REv. 1171 (1988); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has
No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986); Edward C. Monahan, Who Is Trying to Kill the Sixth
Amendment?, CRIM. JUST., Summer 1991, at 24; Peter W. Tague, The Attempt to Improve
Criminal Defense Representation, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 109 (1977).
The problem has become more visible as it has become more severe. See, eg., Trisha
Renaud, Man Pleaded Guilty to Namesake's Case, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Dec. 18,
1990, at 2. The overburdening and underfunding of indigent public defense systems has be-
come so profound that in some jurisdictions public defenders are risking their careers by refus-
ing further case assignments from the courts. See, eg., Ann Woolner & Trisha Renaud, Public
Defenders at the Breaking Point, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Sept. 18, 1990, at 2. The
front page announcement of the latter story captures its essence:
Overwhelmed by staggering caseloads, forced to interview clients who are chained to
other prisoners, and now pressured to work even faster, many Fulton County public
defenders have had enough. They say they're going to slow down, making sure each
client gets proper representation. But will the overburdened system break down if
they slow down?
Id. at 1.
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often regarded as a fact rather than a stereotype. Coming into contact
with a naive third-time offender-not, in my experience, an extraordina-
rily unlikely possibility-would teach the beholder that, in the absence of
additional information, a defendant's level of sophistication ought not be
presumed.
A more subtle and typical version of the same phenomenon is the
authors' use of the word "criminal" for people who have been convicted
of crimes. 73 Like "recidivist," the word implies a status, almost a claim
about character, despite all the imperfections of which we claim to be
aware in the conviction-generating process. 74 In Tushnet and Jaff's arti-
cle people convicted of crimes are referred to not just as criminals, but as
people "who have chosen unlawful activity. '75
To the contrary, criminal clinical participants, after extended inter-
actions with a variety of defendants, may come to see the misleading
reductionism in summing up their clients-people with a range of per-
sonalities, abilities, and identities who are often living in challenging cir-
cumstances-as "criminals." In addition, the students' experiences with
the people who are living in these circumstances frequently lead them to
be less than sanguine about using the word "choice" to describe the con-
duct of each of their clients, even those whom they believe to be factually
guilty.76 Although these insights can be derived in other ways, they are
often vividly transmitted in the context of criminal practice or a criminal
clinic.
Tushnet and Jaff make several other assertions that experience in
criminal practice is likely to challenge. First is the blanket assertion that
73. See, eg., Tushnet & Jatf, supra note 4, at 372 n.52.
74. See, eg., Goldstein, supra note 71. Because the imperfections in the conviction-gen-
erating process are primarily related to factfinding, Jerome Frank remains the foremost au-
thority on the vagaries of this process:
[T]he major cause of legal uncertainty is fact-uncertainty-the unknowability, before
the decision of what the court will "find" as the facts, and the unknowability after the
decision of the way in which it "found" those facts. If a trial court mistakenly takes
as true the oral testimony of an honest but inaccurate witness or a lying witness,
seldom can an upper court detect this mistake.... Is the highly moral rule against
murder actually enforced when a court goes wrong on the facts and convicts an
innocent man?
FRANK, supra note 5, at xiv-xv, xxvii.
75. Tushnet & Jaff, supra note 4, at 372 n.52.
76. For useful theoretical descriptions of these experience-based realizations, see the
sources cited supra note 67. For another approach that complicates the notion of "choice" in
criminal behavior, see Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background" Should the Criminal
Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9 (1985).
Delgado's work derives from that of David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49
S. CAL. L. REV. 385 (1976).
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plea bargaining results in a defendant's conviction for a crime "less oner-
ous than the state believes he or she actually committed. '77 Given the
authors' awareness of the phenomenon of overcharging,78 this assertion
is surprising. In many jurisdictions the state's practice is to issue the
most onerous charges, in number and degree, that it possibly can jus-
tify.7 9 This creates bargaining leverage, inducing a guilty plea to pre-
cisely those lesser offenses that accurately capture what the prosecutor
believes to have occurred.
Secondly, in challenging the law and economics notion of a plea
market, Tushnet and Jaff suggest that defendants generally overestimate
the quality of a prosecutor's evidence, causing them to accept higher
sentences than they would in a more optimally functioning market. 80
Although the authors state that this is just their intuition,81 experience in
criminal practice would likely inform their intuition otherwise. My own
experiences, and those of my clinical students, suggest that defendants,
with the assistance of defense attorneys, can often estimate the quality of
a prosecutor's evidence quite accurately. Their risk assessment, however,
often inclines them toward guilty pleas because they also accurately eval-
uate the systemic bias toward convictions, fearing the likelihood that in
many cases a judge, or even a jury, will overestimate the quality of a
prosecutor's evidence.82 The questionable assumptions embedded in
Tushnet and Jafis article hint at the value of exposure to law's operation
in deepening one's understanding of law's meaning. This is the premise
upon which the clinical movement rests.8 3
77. Tustmet & Jaff, supra note 4, at 370 n.41.
78. Id. at 366-67.
79. See HARRY I. SUBIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A METROPOLITAN COURT 34-36 (1966)
(describing the frequency of overcharging where plea bargaining is common); Albert Al-
schuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50, 85-105 (1968)
(describing the common patterns and practices of overcharging and indicating that the prac-
tice seems to be accepted as legitimate by most members of the legal profession); Kenneth A.
Kraus, Plea Bargaining: A Model Court Rule, 4 MICH. J.L. REFORM 487, 490 (1971) (observ-
ing that "in jurisdictions where bargaining is the general rule, there is usually a corresponding,
well-established practice of initial over-charging by prosecutors"). The official commentary on
Article 350 of the American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, which
forbids overcharging, indicates that "overcharging... [is a] widespread and accepted part of
the.., plea bargaining process." MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, art.
350, cmt. at 615 (1975).
80. Tushnet & Jaff, supra note 4, at 372 n.49.
81. Id
82. See, eg., Goldstein, supra note 71. Court congestion, creating a systemic need to
process defendants quickly, contributes to this phenomenon. On court congestion, see infra
note 95. The inadequacies of defense counsel exacerbate this problem as well. See supra note
72 and accompanying text.
83. See Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral, supra note 17, at 1646-49.
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Rather than focusing on law's operation, Tushnet and Jaff choose to
fight formalism with its own analytic weapons. The limited value of this
approach is revealed most sharply in the claim that the authors advance
to challenge the law and economics framework. In this section Tushnet
and Jaff describe the "plea market" as analogous to a "market for lem-
ons" where low quality merchandise is sold for excessive prices.84 This
phenomenon occurs when buyers know far less than sellers about the
quality of the goods that they are purchasing. Most defendants know
less than prosecutors about the actual strengths and weaknesses of the
government's case because prosecutors may not fully reveal this informa-
tion during plea negotiations. Consequently, under the law and econom-
ics model, this flawed plea market should generate suboptimal pleas.85
The classic law and economics response to the "market for lemons"
problem is that buyers will shop for the seller who most fully discloses
information about the merchandise for sale.8 6 In the criminal context
this claim translates as follows: Defendants will choose to commit their
crimes in jurisdictions where prosecutors have an "open file" discovery
policy.87 Tushnet and Jail do not question the absurdity of the assump-
tion that people choose criminal behavior after a detailed, hyper-rational
calculus of its consequences, studying the comparative procedural costs
of committing an offense in various jurisdictions before choosing its site.
Rather, the article simply utilizes this assumption while showing that the
logical conclusions to which it leads are problematic.
Tushnet and Jail first object to the "market for lemons" response
because defendants could never be certain whether a prosecutor's appar-
ently open files were fully open or whether they excluded valuable infor-
mation.88 Next, they compound the absurdity by suggesting that the
increase in criminal activity in the open file jurisdiction would cause the
fully disclosing prosecutors to "race to the bottom," modifying their dis-
covery policies to withhold more information than prosecutors in neigh-
boring jurisdictions.8 9 These possibilities, unfathomable though they are,
demonstrate to Tushnet and Jaff that a system of plea bargaining does
not necessarily function like an efficient market.
In this manner, Tushnet and Jaff join law and economics on its own
terrain in order to show its indeterminacy. In the absence of information
84. Tushnet & Jaff, supra note 4, at 371.
85. Id. at 371-72.
86. Id at 372.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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about the worlds and world views of those who are charged with crimes,
this approach may be necessary. But those who have participated in a
criminal clinic or in criminal practice would be armed with sufficient in-
formation to make the authors' abstract, circuitous route unnecessary.
The law and economics methodology collapses long before reaching an
advanced stage if one has repeatedly observed the behavior, infrequently
motivated by a well-considered calculus of consequences, of so many of
those persons who inhabit the realm of criminal law.
E. Fact Skepticism
The authors seem to understand that experience in criminal
casework would contribute to a critical perspective and they suggest that
such an approach derives from the fact skeptics' version of legal real-
ism.90 Although they see the fact skeptical approach as less well-devel-
oped than the contemporary cls version of rule skepticism, they suggest
that "the wide scope of this [law-in-action] perspective is likely to lead to
a more realistic and thoughtful response to the problems of law enforce-
ment, and to useful insights into the operation of law more generally." 91
The section of Tushnet and Jaff's introduction summarizing this
law-in-action approach and promising its development in the second part
of the article92 made my clinician's heart leap. Unfortunately, my hope
proved to exceed the help actually rendered in this section. In fact, but
for its focus on "the people at the bottom of the official hierarchy of jobs
that constitutes the criminal justice system,"93 one is hard pressed to un-
derstand why Tushnet and Jaff call this a law-in-action perspective at all.
Devoid of details or examples of how the system actually works at
this level, the article suggests a series of reconceptualizations of the
problems of a criminal justice bureaucracy.94 But the rush to concep-
tualize at high levels of generality before undertaking methods of immer-
sion in the multilayered events about which one is generalizing is
precisely the flower-cutting impulse that clinical educators are seeking to
subdue and surmount. Careful empirical observation is the hallmark of
clinical education, not because a litigator can ever know what really has
happened in the world, but because the impossibility of really knowing
creates an urgency about trying. Criminal justice participants, in clinical
settings or otherwise, continually make judgments of grave importance
90. Id. at 376-82.
91. Id. at 363.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 377.
94. Id. at 378-82.
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against a backdrop of uncertainty. Yet the stakes of these judgments
require the actors to exercise as much care as possible in tailoring deci-
sions to the problems actually confronted.95
As Tushnet and Jaff's references to law-in-action indicate, the au-
thors are aware of the chaotic interplay of a wide variety of detail and
doctrine, variables and values, people and perspectives in any criminal
case. Yet they have chosen to discuss criminal procedure only at an ele-
vated level of generality. Indeed, despite its focus on a single case, this
article cannot be described as a case study (although the authors do de-
scribe it as such)9 6 in the literal sense of "the study of a case." Instead,
the article builds a conceptual schema that uses the vehicle of a criminal
case to illustrate highly abstract notions. In this sense, the article exhib-
its the same tendencies as the Supreme Court opinions that the authors
would likely view as so centrally linked to the maintenance of liberal
legalism. 97
The choice to distill a welter of unwieldy primary material into a
few general points whose meaning and import can be quickly discerned is
not unavailing. The product is a conceptually intriguing work. Yet,
from a clinician's standpoint, a problem with both the Supreme Court
and with authors like Tushnet and Jaff is that the wealth of crucial and
pertinent data is underexplored and overinterpreted.
IV. Clinical Response to the Case
How would a clinician approach the case of Bordenkircher v. Hayes?
Most likely, through an attorney-client relationship with Paul Hayes.
What would she see when standing in this position? Certainly she would
see doctrines about plea bargaining and prosecutorial discretion. She
would also see the motivations, personalities, customs, prejudices, and
values of the various actors, as well as the swirl of local political, eco-
95. Systemic overload often undercuts the care with which actors would make these judg-
ments were they practicing under more desirable conditions. A limited caseload distinguishes
clinical education practice from most other lawyering settings, which are impelled by the pri-
mary aims of profit and/or service. Some authors have urged limiting caseloads even in an
indigent legal services context, though they recognize the difficulty of doing so. See Gary
Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Pub-
lic Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REv. 337 (1978); Carol Ruth Silver, The Imminent Failure of
Legal Services for the Poor: Why and How to Limit Caseload, 46 U. DET. J. URB. L. 217
(1969). On criminal court congestion specifically, see BARRY MAHONEY, CHANGING TIMES
IN TRIAL COURTS: CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT AND DELAY REDUCTION IN URBAN TRIAL
COURTS (1988); Peter F. Nardulli, The Caseload Controversy and the Study of Criminal
Courts, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 89 (1979).
96. Tushnet & Jaff, supra note 4, at 361.
97. See Jerome Frank's analogous criticism of the rule skeptics, supra note 55.
April 1992] BEYOND CUT FLOWERS
nomic, bureaucratic, and psychological factors that all constitute this
case. These are the factors, not doctrine alone, that define what the crim-
inal law is for Mr. Hayes.
We can now only speculate about the factors that comprise this
case. Perhaps a close reading of the original case record (trial tran-
scripts, pleadings, briefs, and so forth) might offer hints about some of
these factors. Yet the texture of the case is not recorded in written form,
despite its inevitable influence on the way the case evolved. In the ab-
sence of a richly reconstructed ethnographic study, we can only ask ques-
tions about material that we would likely have absorbed instinctively had
we been present for the original proceedings. How did the prosecutor
understand Paul Hayes; did he, for example, view him as a menace to
society?98 What were the grounds for his judgment? What were the ra-
cial identities of the players? Did racial stereotyping play a role? Did the
prosecutor have knowledge of others in Hayes' family? Had he had prior
contact with Hayes' defense attorney? What were the psychological
motivations for the prosecutor's harsh action; might his conduct derive
from personal pathology, a vindication of his psychological needs
through a vindictive approach to others? Was his typical bargaining
style more lenient? Was this an exception? Was it a re-election strategy?
Had his leniency in another case backfired? Was he seeking to bolster his
reputation before a particularly harsh trial judge? Was he simply inexpe-
rienced? Was he quite experienced and quite jaded?
How did the trial judge understand Paul Hayes? Had the judge
been a proponent or an opponent of the habitual criminal statute? Was
the judge politically ambitious? Was the judge politically vulnerable?
What professional experience had the judge acquired before taking the
bench? Had years of sitting on the bench hardened the judge to another
defendant's tale of woe? Was he personally acquainted with anyone like
Paul Hayes? Did the judge have a strong personality? Conversely, was
he easily intimidated by a staunch prosecutor?
What would a defense attorney want to know about Paul Hayes?
Why did Hayes refuse to plead guilty, ignoring the prosecutor's threat to
indict him as a habitual criminal? Did he firmly believe in his innocence
of the charge? Did he acknowledge his legal culpability, but view even
the original plea offer as unreasonably steep? Did he believe mitigating
circumstances existed that entitled him to leniency? Was his an act of
uncompromising dignity despite the calculated risk? Was it politically
98. It appears from the reported judicial opinions that all of the primary actors in this
case were males. Hence, I use male pronouns throughout this discussion.
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motivated-a symbolic refusal to give the state coercive authority over
the choices entrusted to him by law? How did Hayes experience the
other actors in his case-prosecutor, judge, defense attorney, and
others-and how did he experience the events themselves? Was his
course of action worth it to him? In retrospect, did he regret it deeply?
There is no basis for anything but speculation about the answers to
these questions concerning the constellation of forces potentially influ-
encing this case. The point is that for a clinical professor and student,
simultaneously studying this case and assuming professional responsibili-
ties within it, the inquiry would be grounded in the experiential reality of
the case.99 A full, contextualized understanding of the case would be
essential to the lawyer's roles of problem-solving with Hayes about legiti-
mate informal mechanisms available for favorably affecting the result,
advising him about the risks and possible outcomes of various courses of
conduct, and helping predict the likelihood of various outcomes. A con-
textualized understanding would also be essential to truly grasping what
the law means and should mean in circumstances like these.
The quality of one's insights about the arrangements that promote
substantive justice depends on studying law, including doctrine, in the
colorful, textured, and tangled web in which it lives. Further, the con-
text widens the range of insights that one might have about nondoctrinal
matters, while enhancing the possibility of coming to grips with the ac-
tual and normative limits on prosecutorial discretion in its interaction
with plea bargaining. Cutting off doctrine from the complex events in
which doctrine functions serves to narrow and diminish the range and
quality of doctrinal understanding and understanding generally.
V. Developing a Clinical Response to Critical Legal Theory
As suggested by the clinical response to Bordenkircher v. Hayes and
to Tushnet and Jaff's discussion of the issues raised by the case, clinical
education contains an implicit constructive critique of critical legal the-
ory. This critique centers on the absence of epistemological awareness in
some cls work, in its inattention to the process by which it builds theory.
Clinicians are seeking to chart a theory-building course more sensi-
tive to the variety, complexity, and ambiguity of the highly charged
99. For arguments that the assumption of professional responsibility is an essential aspect
of the clinical inquiry, see Barbara Bezdek, Reconstructing a Pedagogy of Responsibility, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 1159 (1992); Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care
into Professional Responsibility, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1175 (1992). Although empirical observa-
tion alone can ground clinical inquiry, the assumption of professional responsibility adds
greater emotional weight and immediacy to the lessons drawn.
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events upon which lawmakers pass judgment and to the pluralism of in-
terpretations of these events in the minds of a diverse array of legal deci-
sionmakers and legal observers. 100 Otherwise, clinicians fear that they
may unwittingly perpetuate biases and submerge genuine issues that are
clearer to others who view the same data from a different standpoint. 10'
For these reasons, clinical education offers hope of repairing the theory/
practice split that pervades other movements.
Clinical education could contribute to cls a theory-building episte-
mology rooted in lawyers', clients', and others' experiences of legal bu-
reaucracies in all their chaos and complexity. In developing this
contribution, clinical educators would join the ranks of feminist legal the-
orists and critical race theorists who have expressed appreciation for cer-
tain aspects of cls theory while simultaneously developing important
critiques. Like feminist and critical race theorists, clinical educators
would challenge the failure of cls to fully develop its method of "experi-
ential deconstruction"-the exploration of an historically specific context
centered on how a person experiences society and the legal system and
feels their impact in his or her daily life.' 02
Critical race theorists claim that the absence of contextualized
methodology has led cls to ignore the material conditions and belief sys-
tems that characterize the lives of many people of color and to overlook
the power of racist consciousness in engendering acquiescence to current
social arrangements. 0 3 The cls literature, critical race theorists observe,
overemphasizes the role of consent (to legal hierarchy) and under-
emphasizes the role of coercion (in maintaining race hierarchy). ' 4 Criti-
cal race scholars view the experiences of people of color as suggesting a
more important role for rights acquisition and rights rhetoric than cer-
tain cls scholars have advocated.' 0 5
100. See Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral, supra note 17, at 1673.
101. Id. at 1675-87 (stating that clinical education, when borrowing directly from feminist
methods, gains an "enhanced appreciation of the existence and consequence of multiple
perspectives").
102. This term, with the qualifying adjective "experiential," comes from Cook, supra note
2, at 988.
103. Id. at 985-86; see also Crenshaw, supra note 2, at 1356-58.
104. Crenshaw, supra note 2, at 1358-60.
105. Id. at 1364-66; see also Cook, supra note 2, at 1034-41; Richard Delgado, The Ethe-
real Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 301, 305-18 (1987); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 353-99 (1987); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical
Notes: Reconstructed Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401,
413-16 (1987); Williams, Taking Rights Aggressively, supra note 2, at 121-27.
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A feminist critique of cls parallels the critical race critique in numer-
ous respects. Feminist legal theorists claim that the failure of cls scholars
to adopt a contextual methodology has led them to ignore the material
conditions of many women's lives, limiting the applicability of cls theo-
ries.106 Feminist scholars also fault cls for overlooking the power of pa-
triarchal consciousness in engendering acquiescence to social
arrangements and overstating the role of consent (to legal hierarchy) at
the expense of the role of coercion (in gender hierarchy). 10 7 Theorists
involved in the feminist movement have interpreted their experiences to
recommend, contrary to cls, the value of rights acquisition strategies in
the quest for substantive equality, although like the critical race scholars,
feminists are neither unsophisticated nor unconflicted in their approach
to rights consciousness. 108
Following the scholarly lead of these alternative movements, clinical
educators would join critical legal scholars in some of their work, but
hope to influence and broaden the methodology of cls. Given the rela-
tionship between doing and knowing, clinical educators recognize that
broadening one's methods is likely to broaden one's knowledge and
broadening one's knowledge is likely to change one's theories. Clinicians
would urge cls scholars to involve themselves regularly in the realities of
legal processes as an important precondition for the intensive reflection
that will lead to theorizing about the nature and efficacy of these
processes.
Critical scholars may find, for example, that in the bureaucratic con-
text of criminal case processing, legitimation is a less powerful phenome-
non than expected. True, the rituals of criminal processes, such as plea
hearings and adversarial trials, must have some legitimating effect.
Otherwise, people might refuse to believe that fair, equitable, and impor-
tant reasons justify locking in institutions for much of their lives a dis-
proportionate number of poor and dark-skinned people. 109 Yet the need
106. See West, Jurisprudence, supra note 3, at 3-15.
Underlying both radical and cultural feminism is a conception of women's existential
state that is grounded in women's potential for physical, material connection to
human life, just as underlying both liberal and critical legalism is a conception of
men's existential state that is grounded in the inevitability of men's physical separa-
tion from the species.
Id. at 14.
107. See Crenshaw, supra note 2, at 1358-60; West, Critical Social Theory, supra note 3, at
66.
108. See Schneider, supra note 3, at 610-12, 648-52; see also Martha Minow, Interpreting
Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1867 (1987).
109. Most studies indicate that white defendants receive statistically shorter sentences
than similarly situated African-American and Hispanic defendants. See, e.g., Marc Mauer,
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for the bureaucracy to chum the cases quickly leads to speeding through
rituals in a disinterested fashion. Pro forma compliance may undermine
some of the legitimating power that ritual can have.' 10
Moreover, some criminal defendants who are the objects of these
rituals may be perfectly aware that the system expends little official effort
on trying to understand their lives, their motivations, their claims of in-
nocence, or the full stories of the actual events that underlie specific
charges. Therefore, legitimation may work best for those who know least
about what criminal justice bureaucracies actually do. Critical scholars
may find that coming to know more about law's working in bureaucratic
settings leads to different nuances in elements of their theoretical struc-
tures and perhaps to new structures entirely.
One way in which clinical educators might influence cls is by expos-
ing cls theory more directly to the clinic caseload which, in its typical
form, is spawned by the conditions of poverty and poverty's concomitant
problems. Through this exposure, clinical education offers cls an oppor-
tunity to interact in an instrumental setting with people of diverse back-
grounds and to modify its theories to account for the infusion of their
narratives and perspectives. For feminists, critical race scholars, and
clinical educators, this infusion represents a moral and epistemological
imperative for a transformative project aimed at reducing hierarchy.
Hence, clinical education offers cls a chance to ground its theories and to
bring its work more closely in line with its political and ethical
intentions.
Clinical education may also offer cls a way out of the conceptual
schism that has impeded its work for the past several years. The concep-
tual schism arises because some of the early cls scholarship employs a
structuralist analysis,111 whereas the poststructuralist influence on recent
Americans Behind Bars, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1992, at 12; Norval Morris, Race and Crime:
What Evidence Is There that Race Influences Results in the Criminal Justice System?, 72 JUDI-
CATURE 111 (1988); Gwynne Peirson, Institutional Racism and Crime Clearance, in BLACK
PERSPECTIVES ON CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 107 (Robert L. Woodson ed.,
1977).
110. For discussion of the problems of adjudicating the extraordinary volume of criminal
cases, see PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
Criminal Justice System: Overview, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 450 (Sanford
H. Kadish ed., 1983).
111. Drawing from the work of Ferdinand de Saussure, Jean Piaget, and Claude Levi-
Strauss, see TERENCE HAWKES, STRUCTURALISM AND SEMIOTICS 11-58 (1977), structuralists
assert that bipolar structural tensions-for example, tensions between individual freedom and
community needs-underlie the surface content of legal doctrines and texts, and that doctrine
mediates between these structural poles. Because the circumstances and conditions that un-
derlie legal conflicts can vary so widely, doctrine's mediating role, which always provides alter-
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scholarship sabotages these prior insights.' 1 2 In The Structure of Black-
stone's Commentaries, for example, Duncan Kennedy wrote that the cog-
nitive structure underlying legal thought was the fundamental
contradiction between the individual and the community.11 3 Legal doc-
trine in every field, he asserted, was designed to mediate the universal
tension between collective values and individual will.114 But poststruc-
turalists deny the possibility that any claim can represent the grand, tran-
scendent truth about law. Poststructuralists reject any account that
purports to distill numberless details into single, dearly held
interpretations.115
The growing discomfort of critical thinkers with a claim to an essen-
tial interpretation of complex, interactive, worldly phenomena has been
fed by both poststructuralist intellectual currents and by the coinciding
critiques of distinct groups, especially feminists and people of color, who
assert that the essentialist interpretations previously advanced have ex-
cluded their experiences and perspectives. 1 6 Accordingly, these criti-
quers assert, original cls interpretations are incomplete, if not invalid.
Clinical legal education, on the other hand, may provide a setting which
native decisional options, creates indeterminacy. For premier examples of structural legal
analysis, see Duncan Kennedy, The Structure ofBlackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REv.
209 (1979) [hereinafter Kennedy, Blackstone's Commentaries]; Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) [hereinafter Kennedy,
Form and Substance].
112. Drawing from the work of Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault,
see THE STRUCTURALIST CONTROVERSY (Richard Macksey & Eugenio Donato eds., 1972)
(collecting articles), poststructuralists assert that all texts lend themselves to multiple interpre-
tations. See David Kennedy, Critical Theory, Structuralism and Contemporary Legal Scholar-
ship, 21 NEw ENG. L. REV. 209, 280-87 (1985-86). Because objective, nonideological
interpretations do not exist, poststructuralists focus on the indeterminacy of meaning gener-
ally, not just the indeterminacy of doctrine. See David Couzens Hoy, Interpreting the Law:
Hermeneutical and Poststructuralist Perspectives, 58 CAL. L. REV. 135 (1985). Therefore, a
poststructuralist would not accept any structural interpretation as authoritative, since its
meaning, like all meanings, is indeterminate and contingent on understandings external to the
text. Id.; see also David Kennedy, The Turn to Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 251 (1985)
[hereinafter Kennedy, Turn to Interpretation]. For a graphic view of the difference between
structural and poststructural analysis, compare Kennedy, Blackstone's Commentaries, supra
note 111, and Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 111, with Kennedy, Turn to Interpre-
tation, supra, and David Kennedy, Spring Break 63 TEX. L. REV. 1377 (1985) [hereinafter
Kennedy, Spring Break].
113. Kennedy, Blackstone's Commentaries, supra note 111, at 211-12.
114. Id at 213-14.
115. See, eg., Kennedy, Spring Break; supra note 112. For a thoughtful discussion of the
structuralist/poststructuralist tension, see James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal
Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 742-48 (1985). Roberto Unger
recognized this tension a decade earlier. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE
AND POLrrics 125-28 (1975).
116. See Boyle, supra note 115, at 773-78.
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minimizes the intellectual and exclusionary problems of single interpre-
tive accounts.
Clinical educators seek to use clinical experiences as the springboard
into critical examination of a variety of topics.117 These topics include
the lawyer's professional roles and responsibilities, the structure and
function of the legal system, and the possibilities for systemic improve-
ment in the interests of substantive justice. Although clinical partici-
pants will derive broad insights from their insider's view of legal
phenomena, no particular interpretation is collectively advanced. 1 8
Rather, the clinical methodology underlines the importance of the pro-
cess by which one gathers and synthesizes information in coming to one's
own interpretations.' 19 Clinical education, then, is an epistemology, not
an orthodoxy. Clinical educators encourage and expect clinical partici-
pants, all of whom have access to thick layers of data, to devise multiple
interpretations of multiple phenomena.
A clinician would assess the value of a structural analysis not in
substantive terms, but by virtue of the process by which it was derived.
A deficient analysis is one derived in the absence of careful empiricism
and devoid of the data from which alternative interpretive accounts
might be constructed. An analysis might also be critiqued for overstating
its hold on truth and excluding the possibility of other takes on truth.
Clinical theory can reach any number of intermediate destinations as
long as it remains open to inductive and deductive analyses that may
move the theory-building endeavor to yet another, never assuredly final,
location.120
This clinical methodology diminishes the problem of reification.1 21
Although the clinical method depends on generalizing from one's exper-
117. See, e.g., Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral, supra note 17, at 1654-56.
118. The fact that clinical participants are sometimes well-positioned to develop broad
insights does not mean that they will do so. Variables affecting this outcome include personal
inclination and clinical pedagogy. Moreover, there is danger in drawing overbroad insights
that are not justified by the particularities of the experience. Nevertheless, clinical education
has the potential to engage its participants in examining the cultural role of law, the meaning
and impact of their profession, and the extent to which they can generalize from their exper-
iences. See Gary Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on Clinical
Education as Methodology, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 374, 394-97
(1973). See also Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral, supra note 17, at 1646-67 (describing
pedagogical aims of clinical education).
119. See, eg., Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral, supra note 17, at 1675-87 (drawing on
feminist approaches to theory building in understanding and developing clinical methods).
120. Id.
121. Reification refers to the tendency to treat concepts as having an objective reality in-
dependent of created, interpreted reality. See generally Peter Gabel, Reification in Legal Rea-
soning, 3 REs. L. & Soc. 25 (1980) (exploring the reification of legal concepts and processes).
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iences, these generalizations are not polished off and set apart from their
contexts-the conditions under which reification flourishes. 122 Rather,
the generalizations are folded back into the everyday context from which
they emerged for purposes of verification and refinement.
In clinical settings all interpretive theories, structural or poststruc-
tural, emerge from thick layers of data. Unless these theories perpetually
withstand the test of further data, they will be subject to constant revi-
sion. Therefore, nothing in the clinical method precludes either struc-
turalist analysis or poststructuralist awareness. Critical legal scholars
would do well to turn to clinical legal education to help reconcile the
tensions that have stunted their growth.123 The inherent contextualism
of clinical legal education is the source of its healing and the intellectual
secret to letting flowers keep growing.
122. Id
123. Clinical education might help to heal not just this scholarly rift, but the rift between
some critical theorists and practitioners. Bob Gordon has identified this tension in his essay in
THE POLrTICS OF LAWv, supra note 21, at 281-82.
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